Abstract -Most households persistently invest in riskless assets but not stocks, and may do so because they perceive information required for market participation to be costly relative to expected benefits. In a Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM) increased risk aversion, income risk, and lower resources reduce the information expense sufficient to deter stockholding. Bivariate probit analysis using the 1983-1989 Survey of Consumer Finances shows that households with lower risk aversion, higher education, and greater wealth who were nonstockholders in 1983 had an increased conditional probability of entering by 1989, whereas 1983 stockholders with lower resources, more limited education, and greater risk aversion were more likely to be nonstockholders by 1989.
I. Introduction
F INANCIAL advisors stress the importance of investing part of the household portfolio in stocks to provide adequate resources for retirement, as well as to meet rising costs of a college education and to provide for the possibility of nursing home or other long-term care for household members or elderly parents. Typical investment profiles for young, middle aged, and older households recommend at least some investment in stocks, with the proportion of the portfolio in stocks highest for young households who have the longest investment horizons. However, despite a historic excess return on stocks over short-term riskless assets of over 600 basis points, 1 most U.S. households do not invest in the stock market. Only 20% of U.S. households held publicly traded stocks or shares of mutual stock funds in 1983, according to the Survey of Consumer Finances. With the growth of mutual stock funds, this percentage was little changed in 1989, but had increased to about 28% in 1992. Adding stocks held indirectly in IRAs, 401(k)'s, and defined benefit pensions increases stock ownership to 38% of the population in 1992 and to 41% in 1995, according to newly released statistics from the 1995 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances. While many nonstockholders have few financial assets at all, the puzzle of nonstockholders is by no means restricted to low-wealth households. In 1992, 45% of households with holdings of liquid riskless assets between $60,000 and $100,000 did not directly hold shares of stocks or mutual stock funds, and 28% of households with over $100,000 in liquid riskless assets did not hold stocks directly. 2 That most households hold incomplete portfolios has been recognized in empirical papers based on the original Surveys of Financial Characteristics of Consumers conducted in the early 1960s. Most of these papers motivated incomplete portfolios by assuming differential ''monitoring costs'' for some assets, or by assuming that short-sales restrictions prevent individuals from optimally holding negative positions in some assets. The precise reasons for why households do not hold stocks are relevant for a wide range of papers estimating portfolio shares. Uhler and Cragg (1971) investigated portfolio diversification using the 1960s surveys, assuming that there exist ''nuisance costs'' to holding small quantities of some assets, which decrease with the amount held. King and Leape (1984) use the 1979 Survey of Consumer Financial Decisions while Perraudin and Sorensen (1991) use the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances to study the determinants of not holding certain assets in a particular year, and then estimate asset demands. Agell and Edin (1990) perform a similar exercise using data on Swedish households. 3 King and Leape (1987) attribute the limited incidence of stockholding to the exogenous and random arrival of information over time, implying that age should contribute to the probability of being a stockholder. Ioannides (1992) studies the effects of changes in variables relating to the life cycle on portfolio shares. Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) explore theoretical reasons why individual households abstain from stock market participation. Using data from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, they find econometric support for the hypothesis that actual or perceived costly information about the stock market can account for agents who hold portfolios of riskless assets but not stocks. This paper builds on the information cost story presented in Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) by estimating a bivariate probit model using the most recent panel data from the 1983 and 1989 Surveys of Consumer Finances. By looking at the same households six years apart, it can assess how household characteristics and major life changes affect portfolio allocation, and whether there have been significant changes in the factors that determine ownership over this period consistent with the observed upward trend in market participation. If costly information about the stock market can deter households from participation, then household portfolios are likely to display persistent behavior, and most households should remain either stockholders or nonstockholders. Conditional on being a nonstockholder in 1983, the probability of becoming a stockholder by 1989 should be larger for households with greater ability to process financial information or to hire financial advisors. If costs of monitoring the portfolio recur each year, a lower level of education or lower wealth should contribute to the decision to leave the stock market in 1989, after having held stocks in 1983. Because the panel data cover the years both before and after the stock market crash in 1987, this provides an opportunity to see whether this event influenced individual households' participation decisions. The standard Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM) and the role of information or monitoring costs in deterring stock market participation are presented in section II. Section III presents an econometric model for investigating stock market participation among U.S. households. Details of the data set are given in section IV. Section V presents results from the bivariate probit estimation, and section VI concludes.
II. The Stockholding Puzzle and Information Costs in a Basic Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model
In the basic CCAPM each agent maximizes expected utility. The utility function is additively separable, and future utility is discounted at the rate ␤. The agent can borrow or invest in two assets, one with a riskless rate of return and one with stochastic return (stocks). The agent's optimization problem is
subject to the constraints
where c t is real consumption in time t, y t is exogenous real labor income in t, A t is total wealth at time t, s t is total real saving in t, ␣ t is the amount saved in the risky asset in time t, 1 ϩ r is the gross riskless return, and z t is the excess return on stocks over the riskless rate. Following Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) , the introduction of a ''cost'' of stock market participation, representing either the lump-sum expense of obtaining information by purchasing investment guides or subscribing to investment magazines, or the opportunity cost of the time spent in obtaining investment information, 4 results in the constraints
if the household makes the necessary expense l and invests in stocks, or
if the household does not acquire the information and invests in riskless assets only. If the cost of acquiring the information necessary for market participation is perceived to be sufficiently high to remove the expected utility gain, the household will not make the expenditure. If costs are not just ''ticket fees'' that permit participation, but some fraction also recurs each period as the expense of monitoring the portfolio and learning of new investment opportunities, they may be sufficient to make an individual persistently abstain from the market.
Simulations of a calibrated life-cycle model, described in detail in Bertaut and Haliassos (1997) , 5 show that this cost will vary by degree of risk aversion, with the introduction of labor income risk, and with the introduction of a bequest motive. 6 Following Hubbard et al. (1994 Hubbard et al. ( , 1995 , the income 4 Costs associated with stock investment can occur in two stages. First, there is the acquisition of information about the general risks and benefits of investing in the stock market. This can be through the purchase of investment guides, or through the time spent attending seminars on investment strategies, in identifying a good broker or financial advisor, or in conversations with relatives and colleagues. Once the decision to enter the market is made, there are additional ongoing costs of how to manage the portfolio. Fees paid to brokers or financial advisors become ongoing expenses, but are likely to be proportional to transactions (Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) ). 5 Households are assumed to live for three 20-year periods, and to receive exogenous labor income in each period. Incomes are calibrated from the average income of households with the same age and level of education in the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances, distinguishing between those without a high school diploma or equivalency degree, those with a high school diploma but no college degree, and those with a college degree or more. This classification is motivated by similarities of long-run income processes of such households. When income risk is introduced, households face transitory and permanent income shocks which also vary by education level, following the process defined in Hubbard et al. (1994 Hubbard et al. ( , 1995 . The riskless return is set to the mean riskless rate estimated by Siegel (1992) over the period of 1800-1990, which is similar to the Mehra-Prescott riskless return. Stock returns can take a high or a low value with equal probability, matching the first two moments of the MehraPrescott long-run empirical distribution. The expected value and the standard deviation of 20-year holding returns are derived following the process described in Haliassos and Lyon (1994) . 6 A bequest motive is introduced by allowing for a bequest G in the third period,
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processes differ by level of education. Households are assumed to have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions with risk aversion parameter ␥. The level of information cost sufficient to deter stock market participation is solved for as the (endogenous) reduction in resources sufficient to yield the same expected utility the household would receive by investment in riskless assets alone, under the assumption that the information cost is paid prior to investment in the first period, and one-fourth of the cost recurs in the second period of life. Figure 1 shows the ratio of information cost to the first-period income that would make the household indifferent between undergoing the information expense to invest in stocks and forgoing the expense and investing in riskless assets only, by degree of risk aversion, for households at each of the three education levels. If the ratio of information cost to income falls below the line plotted, the household will be better off by undertaking the information expense and investing in the stock market. For any ratio of cost to income above the line, the household will not wish to undertake the information expense, and will have higher expected utility by investing only in riskless assets. The ratio of the information cost sufficient to deter investment in stocks relative to first-period income is highest for collegeeducated households. Although these households have the highest first-period income, the utility gains to stock market investment for these households are sufficiently large that it would take a large information expense to deter their participation. At each level of education, the income cost is a decreasing function of the degree of risk aversion. For any degree of risk aversion, the introduction of (uncorrelated) income risk lowers the information cost sufficient to deter investment. The addition of a bequest motive, however, increases the information cost. Households that care not only about their own future consumption but plan to leave a bequest as well have a greater incentive to participate in the stock market and take advantage of the expected equity premium, and consequently the information cost required to deter their participation is higher. These simulation results suggest that in addition to variables that capture access to investment opportunities and information about the market, lower risk aversion, higher expected future income, absence of income risk, and presence of a bequest motive will also contribute positively to the probability of holding stocks.
III. Specification of the Model of Stock Market Participation
In the standard CCAPM demands for each asset are determined jointly, and the specification of asset demands should consider simultaneously the portfolio choice across all possible asset combinations. When we allow for the possibility of incomplete portfolios where not all assets are held, the number of possible asset combinations is 2 n Ϫ 1, which becomes very large as the number of assets n rises. Studies that have tried to estimate the simultaneous decision have resorted to very aggregated portfolio combinations to where the parameter controls the choice between last-period consumption and bequest. If households care about bequests, they will behave so as to leave a bequest in any state of the world. make the estimation feasible (Uhler and Cragg (1971) , King and Leape (1984) , Perraudin and Sorensen (1991) ). However, if the aim is to estimate the probability of ownership of a particular asset, then a reduced-form equation which does not include other asset demands can be estimated separately. This approach is also used by Ioannides (1992) and Agell and Edin (1990) . As in the standard CCAPM, households are assumed to maximize utility of consumption, and for estimation, we assume that the household's indirect utility function can be written as a linear function of household characteristics plus an error term u i . Let
be the indirect utility function when households invest in the stock market, and let
be the indirect utility function when households do not invest in the stock market. The X i 's are observable variables pertaining to household i's characteristics. These include current wealth and income as well as measures of the parameters of the utility function, such as degree of risk aversion, rate of time preference, and the intention of leaving a bequest. The X i 's also include additional variables that may help explain apparent underinvestment in stocks if information costs are important for the stockholding decision, such as level of education, access to financial market information, and age. The level of education may also be indicative of future income prospects, which in turn may influence portfolio decisions, as demonstrated in Bertaut and Haliassos (1997) . The u i error terms include unobserved household-specific factors that may be important for the stockholding decision. In practice, the indirect utility function is not observable, and we instead observe a dummy variable of participation or nonparticipation in the stock market,
that is, the household's utility is higher when holding stocks than when not participating in the stock market, and
Then we have the probability that
With the assumption that the error terms ⑀ i are normally distributed, this dichotomous choice model can be estimated by probit maximum likelihood. Since we have access to panel data with household portfolio choices in two years, we can specify a bivariate model and allow for unobserved heterogeneity resulting from household-specific factors with correlation between the disturbances for each household i,
If the errors are jointly normally distributed, the equations for 1983 and 1989 can be estimated by bivariate probit (Greene (1993) ). The variance of ⑀ it , 2 , is normalized to 1 because only the ratio of ␤/ can be identified by probit maximum likelihood. The probabilities that enter the likelihood function are then given by the bivariate normal cumulative distribution
where
and
is the bivariate normal density.
IV. Data from the 1983-1989 Panel Survey of Consumer Finances
The data set used for estimation is the 1983 and 1989 panels of the Survey of Consumer Finances. This data set contains detailed information on household portfolios and incomes, and respondent attitudes toward financial risk, liquidity, use of credit, and reasons for saving at two points in time. The definition of stockholding includes shares of publicly traded stocks plus shares in mutual funds in 1983, 266 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS and shares of publicly traded stocks plus shares of stock or combination mutual funds in 1989. 7 The sample used for this paper categorizes as nonstockholders in 1983 the 68 households who owned stocks only in the company in which a household member was employed, and in 1989, 75 such households. Because costs associated with acquiring such stocks are minimal compared with holding other stocks, and returns to such stocks may have different covariance properties with household labor income, the behavior of these households may distort conclusions about variables relevant for the decision to acquire stocks. Since we use several variables on respondent attitudes, the sample is restricted to households where the respondent is the same in both years. The resulting sample contains 1368 households. Because observations are available for two periods in time, we can observe the stockholding decisions of households who held stocks in both 1983 and 1989, those who abstained from market participation in both years, and those who changed stockholder status. The number of sample respondents holding stocks in 1983 is 475, corresponding to 16.8% of U.S. households. In 1989, 469 sample respondents held stocks, corresponding to 17.7% of U.S. households. However, the composition of the 1989 stockholders was not the same as that in 1983. Nearly 25% of the 1983 stockholders in the sample (corresponding to about 7% of the population) did not hold stocks in 1989, about the same percentage of 1989 stockholders who had been nonstockholders in 1983 (see table 1). 8 Specifying the model as a bivariate probit allows the calculation not only of the probabilities of stock ownership in both 1983 and 1989, but also of the conditional probabilities of continued participation or nonparticipation.
For estimation of the 1983 and 1989 stockholding decisions, the set of respondent characteristics includes dummy variables for sex, race, and marital status in 1983. Respondent age is included through a set of 10-year age-range dummies to investigate whether the ability to overcome inertial reasons for nonparticipation-for example, through increased exposure to information-increases with age, or alternatively whether older households are deterred from stockholding by the shorter investment horizons they may face. Dummy variables for retirement in 1983, remaining retired in 1989, or becoming retired between 1983 and 1989 are included to capture these life-cycle changes.
Dummy variables are included for whether the household head had less than high school education and whether the head had a college degree, with having a high school degree but no college degree as the omitted dummy variable. This distinction is important for the extent to which higher education leads to greater financial sophistication and ability to acquire information necessary for market participation, but may also reflect long-run income prospects. More educated households may have both a greater ability and a greater incentive to overcome inertial behavior by undertaking costs associated with stock market participation, as indicated in figure 1. Figure 1 also shows that for any level of education, the addition of income risk lowers the cost sufficient to deter stock market participation. To capture labor income risk, dummy variables are included in the bivariate probit for having an occupation with above or below average unemployment risk (see data appendix). A dummy variable is also included for having a managerial occupation, since managers may have smaller opportunity costs to finding out about investment opportunities due to being involved in related professional activities.
Current household wealth is divided into financial and nonfinancial assets to capture differences in portfolio decisions that may arise from liquidity considerations. Financial net worth includes relatively liquid riskless assets, directly held stocks, and shares in mutual funds, bonds, trusts and other managed accounts, IRAs, and the cash value of life insurance, minus the total outstanding on consumer loans. Nonfinancial net worth includes investment in real estate, automobiles, and other consumer durables, net of any loans outstanding for these assets. For both financial and nonfinancial net worth, the probit regression uses the logarithm of the value. Current labor income is estimated as wage and salary income, income derived from a professional business or practice, unemployment or worker's compensations payments, and income from Social Security and other pensions, and is also included as the logarithm of its value. To facilitate the comparison of coefficients across the 1983 and 1989 equations, financial wealth, nonfinancial wealth, and income in 1983 are converted to 1989 dollar amounts using 7 There may be some overstatement of the incidence of stockholding in 1983 because it is not possible to identify stock mutual funds separately from other types of mutual funds. However, in both 1983 and 1989, very few respondents held only shares in mutual funds and no other stocks. Only 40 sample respondents (corresponding to less than 3% of the population) held only shares in mutual funds in 1983. In 1989 it is possible to identify stock and combination mutual funds separately from bond funds, and 46 respondents (corresponding to 3% of the population) held only shares of stock mutual funds. Two-thirds of the respondents who held only mutual funds in 1983 are classified again as stockholders in 1989. 8 Some households classified as nonstockholders in both 1983 and 1989 may be very active market participants, but happened to have liquidated their positions in both interview periods. Evidence from the 1983 survey suggests that this is a rare occurrence. Only one household reported having a brokerage account and trading in the year previous to the interview, but not holding any stocks at the time of the interview. HOUSEHOLDS: 1983 the change in the population-weighted average for each of these values. 9 Dummy variables are included for self-expressed risk aversion, measured by the individual's responses to questions in each year of how much financial risk he was willing to take for commensurate financial return. Households are coded as ''willing to take above average or substantial risk to receive above average or substantial expected return,'' ''average risk to receive average return'' (the omitted dummy), and ''not willing to take any financial risk.'' As the calibrations in figure 1 show, the utility gain from stock market participation is smaller for agents with greater risk aversion, so these agents can be deterred from participation by relatively low costs of acquiring information. In a nonexpected utility framework that allows for ''first-order risk aversion,'' households can be deterred from stock market participation even if information is costless to them because their utility functions are not differentiable at zero stock investment (Yaari (1987) , Segal and Spivak (1990) , and Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) ). Dummy variables are also included for whether the household considered itself to be credit constrained. Although Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) find that a restriction on borrowing against future income alone is not sufficient to deter market participation, 10 relatively small information costs are required to eliminate utility gains from participation by individuals for whom the constraint is binding (Bertaut (1993) ). Following Cox and Jappelli (1993) , a household was coded as being credit constrained if the respondent indicated that a request for credit had been denied, or less credit than requested had been granted, and the household did not subsequently receive the desired amount of credit elsewhere, or if the household did not apply for credit because it was expected that such a request would be denied.
For both years, a dummy variable is included for whether or not the respondent stated that credit card balances were always paid in full. Paying off credit card balances either could reflect an absence of liquidity constraints or may be a measure of financial astuteness. 11 Dummy variables are included for whether the majority of wealth was inherited (in 1983) or whether a sizable bequest was received (in 1989), and whether the household planned to leave a bequest (in 1989) . Stocks may be especially desirable assets for households with bequest motives, because capital gains on bequeathed stocks escape taxation. As illustrated in figure 1 , adding a bequest motive increases the information cost necessary to deter stock market investment. In addition, if an inheritance received was partly in the form of stocks, the household need not overcome initial inertial behavior to invest, and may continue to participate in the market with little additional expenditure on information.
Although the holding period does not matter for the standard CCAPM, a typical rule of thumb is that stocks are considered a superior investment to bonds for households with investment horizons of five years or more. Dummy variables are included for whether the respondent indicated willingness to tie up funds to achieve above average financial return (in 1983) and for having a main financial planning period of five or more years (in 1989). 12 Use of the panel data set allows for observation of lifestyle changes that may affect portfolio decisions. In addition to the variables on becoming or remaining retired, dummy variables are included for acquiring a new primary job or losing the 1983 primary job. Dummy variables are also included for changes in marital status: remaining married to the same spouse as in 1983; becoming married between 1983 and 1989; and becoming divorced, widowed, or separated between the survey years. The omitted dummy is remaining single. Respondents who became married could increase stock ownership from marrying someone who is already a stockholder, or from an increased interest in planning for the future. We also include variables measuring the (logarithm of) the amount spent on financing education between 1983 and 1989 and for whether the household bought a house during that period. These major expenses could be reasons for exiting the stock market.
Details of all the explanatory variables are included in the data appendix. Table 2 gives the characteristics of three composite respondents. A median or ''typical'' respondent has all variables taken at their population median values. This typical respondent has a high school education, is willing to take average financial risk, 13 has a low unemployment risk occupation, does not pay off credit card balances, did not inherit wealth, and does not intend to leave a bequest. The typical respondent is contrasted with composite individuals who have the characteristics at the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile of the population. In contrast to the median household, the 25th percentile household is younger, is not willing to take any financial risk, has an average unemployment risk occupation, and lower financial and nonfinancial wealth and labor income. The composite household at the 75th percentile is older, has college education, pays off credit card balances, plans to leave a bequest, and has higher labor income and wealth. 9 The increase in the population-weighted average labor income from 1983 to 1989 was 40.1%; for financial net worth, 75.5%; and for nonfinancial net worth, 61.9%. 10 As usually formulated, such a restriction limits the sum of the risky and riskless assets to be Ն0 and does not rule out riskless borrowing for stock investment. 11 Because the average rate of interest on credit cards exceeds the Mehra-Prescott return on stocks, households in a standard CCAPM do not find it optimal to both borrow at the higher riskless rate and hold positive investments in stocks (Bertaut (1993) ). 12 An alternative investment rule of thumb is that the proportion of the portfolio in stocks should be 100 minus current age. Under this strategy, the investment horizon should not matter for the decision of whether or not to hold stocks, since all households should hold some fraction of the portfolio in stocks. Instead, reasons for nonparticipation would more likely reflect a perception of the costs and risks associated with stockholding relative to the perceived benefits. 13 For 1983, the median population response was ''willing to take average financial risk.'' However, in 1989, the median was ''not willing to take any financial risk,'' while ''willing to take average risk'' was recorded at the 53rd percentile. Because this change in willingness to take financial risk distorts probability distributions, the value ''willing to take average risk'' was used to represent the population median in 1989 as well. Table 3 presents the parameter estimates from the 1983-1989 bivariate probit regression. In both years, the parameter estimates for both financial and nonfinancial net worth are positive and significant. Nonfinancial wealth has a larger coefficient than financial wealth in 1983 and a smaller coefficient 1989, suggesting no special role for the liquidity of assets in predicting stock market participation. Comparing across years, the coefficient on financial wealth is significantly larger in 1989, whereas the coefficient on nonfinancial net worth is significantly smaller. Household labor income is not significant in either year. Results for variables capturing unemployment risk provide limited support for the notion that labor income risk can influence market participation. Having an occupation with below average unemployment risk has a positive coefficient significant at the 7% level in 1983, but an insignificant coefficient in 1989. The coefficient on having an occupation with above average unemployment risk is not significant in either year. Having a managerial occupation has an additional significant positive coefficient in 1983 but not in 1989, suggesting perhaps that the information benefits of a managerial job were no longer present by 1989.
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V. Results from the 1983 and 1989 Bivariate Probits
A. Coeffıcient Estimates
The dummy variables for education are highly significant in both years, with college education increasing the predicted probability of being a stockholder and having less than high school education decreasing the probability. The strength of these results, even after controlling for wealth, current income, and unemployment risk, suggests that education captures a measure of the ability to process information about the market and investment opportunities. However, the level of education may also serve as a proxy for future expected resources, and it is not possible to disentangle these two effects.
The coefficients for the dummy variable indicators of risk aversion (willingness to take above average or substantial risk for above average or substantial financial return, and not willing to take any financial risk) have the expected signs and are significantly different from the omitted dummy (willing to take average risk for average return) in both years. Caution should be used in interpreting these results, however, because there is considerable evidence that selfexpressed classifications of risk aversion are imperfect indicators of the respondents' actual degrees of risk aversion. Individuals may be describing their ''ideal'' portfolios rather than portfolio choices they actually face. 14 In addition, these respondent attitudes were not always consistent over time. Many fewer sample households declared they were willing to take above average or substantial risk in 1989, with nearly half of those giving this answer in 1983 switching to average risk in 1989. In addition, about 34% of those willing to take average risk in 1983 were not willing to take any risk in 1989. Although some of these households that switched risk aversion category may have had adverse stock return realizations from the 1987 stock market drop, the majority of those switching from average risk to not willing to take risk were nonstockholders in both years, 14 For instance, 52 respondents held stocks in 1983 and 77 respondents held stocks in 1989, although they claimed at the time that they were ''not willing to take any financial risk.'' However, some of these risk averse stockholders could be describing actual portfolio decisions because they are unwilling to take on additional risk at the margin. Kennickell et al. (1996) find respondents in a small focus group of fairly sophisticated investors who held stocks but nonetheless declared themselves ''not willing to take financial risk,'' meaning that they did not make uninformed (''risky'') investment decisions. HOUSEHOLDS: 1983 while the majority of households that switched from above average risk to average risk were stockholders in both years. 15 In both equations, the coefficients on the age-range dummies increase with age. In 1983 the coefficients on both age ranges under 45 are negative and significantly different from the omitted dummy (age 55-64) at least at the 10% level, decreasing the probability of stock ownership. In 1989, falling in the age range 35-44 significantly reduces the probability of stock ownership, and having age greater than or equal to 75 significantly increases the probability. These results support the notion that increased exposure to information about the stock market can help overcome inertial behavior, and suggest that older households are not deterred by shorter investment horizons. 16 Neither sex, race, nor 1983 marital status is significant.
Considering oneself to be credit constrained has a negative coefficient in both 1983 and 1989, but neither is significant. In contrast, the coefficients on always paying off credit card balances are significant and positive in both years. Paying off credit card balances may be a more objective measure of financial liquidity, or it may be indicative of financial sophistication and the ability to weigh financial costs and benefits. Mixed information is given by the coefficients on inheritance of the majority of wealth. The coefficient for inheritance of the majority of wealth in 1983 is significant at the 5% level, with a coefficient larger than that for paying off credit cards or having a managerial occupation. However, inheriting assets has an insignificant coefficient in 1989. Although most households who had inherited assets in 1989 had not claimed that the majority of their savings came from inheritance in 1983, this does not 15 Starr-McCluer (1995) investigates whether changes in household circumstances can explain changes in stated risk preference in the 1983 and 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances and finds only limited evidence that even substantial changes in health, income, or marital status can explain changes in risk preference. Kimball and Shapiro (1995) also find changes in self-expressed risk tolerance in between waves I and II (taken two years apart) of the Health and Retirement Survey. 16 Older households may also have more time to spend monitoring their portfolios. appear to explain any entry into the stock market between the two years. Expressing an intention to leave a bequest (asked only in 1989) has a significant positive coefficient. 17 Of the variables reflecting either the willingness to tie up funds or financial planning horizons neither is significant. Variables that reflect major life changes between 1983 and 1989 provide some interesting results. Although in 1983 marital status is insignificant, becoming married is almost significant at the 5% level, suggesting that acquisition of assets through family change may be important. Remaining single, remaining married to the same spouse, or becoming divorced, widowed, or separated has no effect. Results are somewhat puzzling for changes to labor force status. Acquiring a new main job has a negative but insignificant coefficient, whereas losing the previous main job has a positive but insignificant coefficient. However, becoming retired between 1983 and 1989 has a large, positive, and significant coefficient. Although this result is intriguing, it is contrary to other indications of life-cycle behavior from the 1983 and 1989 panel surveys (Kennickell and StarrMcCluer (1997) ). Further examination of the data reveal that the majority of respondents in this category were less than 65 years old in 1989. Early retirement may be more feasible for households who have accumulated sufficient wealth through stock market participation. 18 Neither education expense nor buying a house has significant coefficients.
The intercept term in the 1983 equation is significantly more negative than in the 1989 equation, but the impact of the less negative 1989 intercept coefficient is largely offset by the smaller coefficients on income and nonfinancial net worth. For a household with median income and financial and nonfinancial wealth in both 1983 and 1989, the combined effect of the intercept, income, and wealth variables is Ϫ1.42 in 1983 and Ϫ1.22 in 1989. A Wald test rejects the restriction that coefficients on the variables common to the two equations are constant, reflecting these offsetting effects, whereas a second Wald test that coefficients are equal on all common variables excluding the intercept, income, and wealth variables cannot be rejected. These results are consistent with a continuing role for information costs as a barrier to participation within a gradual broadening of the base of stock ownership. A typical household with average increases in income and wealth and no changes to other variables will have a higher probability of ownership in 1989, whereas the additional contribution of high income and wealth to the probability of ownership is smaller in 1989. As noted below, however, the effects on the estimated probabilities are small. The estimate of , the correlation between error terms for each household, is quite large (0.488), and the null hypothesis that households are not subject to household-specific random shocks can be rejected with very high probability by both a Wald test on and a likelihood ratio test. 19 The unconditional probit equations correctly classify about 83% of the respondents and 75% of stockholders in both 1983 and 1989. Table 4 gives the predicted probability of stock ownership in 1983 and 1989 for the composite 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile respondents. The combination of greater wealth, higher education, and greater willingness to take financial risk makes a very large difference in the predicted probability of holding stocks. For an individual with median characteristics, the predicted probability of being a stockholder is 0.144 in 1983 and 0.175 in 1989. For a household with characteristics at the 75th percentile, the predicted probability of holding stocks is considerably higher, 0.594 in 1983 and 0.592 in 1989. In contrast, having characteristics of the 25th percentile generates a probability of less than 0.01 for participation in 1983 and only slightly more in 1989. For the composite median respondent, the slight increase in the probability of stock ownership between 1983 and 1989 largely reflects the combined effects of the smaller 17 This variable may not be a pure measure of intentions, because the ability to leave a bequest may reflect the success of past investments, which in turn may be a function of past stock market participation. Another variable (X5824) asks about the importance of leaving a bequest. Estimation with this variable instead produced an insignificant coefficient. 18 Using population-weighted estimates from the 1983 and 1989 Surveys of Consumer Finances Kennickell and Starr-McCluer (1997) find that a slightly larger percentage of households (9.9%) acquired securities (defined as stocks, bonds, and trusts and other managed accounts) between 1983 and 1989 than ceased holding securities between 1983 and 1989 (9%) . The percentage of households owning securities generally increases with age. However, for households over 65, the percentage that held securities in 1983 but not in 1989 was considerably larger than the percentage acquiring such assets. 19 Under the null hypothesis of no correlation, the joint likelihood is simply the sum of the likelihoods from univariate probit regressions estimated for 1983 and 1989 separately. The sum of these likelihoods is Ϫ1036.91. Table 4 also shows the relative impact of changing only one characteristic on the predicted probabilities for the median respondent. Having less than high school education reduces the probability that an otherwise typical household would be a stockholder in 1983 by about 0.08 in 1983 and by 0.12 in 1989, whereas an increase in education to having a college degree raises the probability of holding stocks by about 0.15 in both years. Unwillingness to take financial risk reduces the probability of ownership by 0.07 in 1983 and by 0.10 in 1989, whereas accepting above average financial risk raises the probability of ownership by about 0.08 in both years. Finally, having financial and nonfinancial net worth equal to the level of the 25th percentile household decreases the probability of ownership by 0.12 in 1983 and by 0.04 in 1989. In contrast, having considerably higher net worth equal to the 75th percentile level, representing the difference between total wealth of $51,217 and $152,500 in 1983 and between $52,990 and $153,510 in 1989, has a relatively small impact and raises the probability of stock ownership only by a little over 0.04 in 1983 and by 0.035 in 1989.
B. Predicted Probabilities of Stock Market Participation
C. Conditional Probabilities of Entering and Leaving the Stock Market
The combination of higher education, lower risk aversion, and greater wealth increases the probability of stock ownership in both 1983 and 1989. A somewhat different question to ask is how likely is a 1983 nonstockholder to continue to be a nonstockholder in 1989, compared with the probability of becoming a stockholder. Conditional probabilities can be estimated from the bivariate normal results as
where Prob (Y 1 ϭ y i1 ) is derived from the univariate normal c.d.f. of the 1983 equation. These conditional probabilities are shown in table 5.
Nonstockholders in 1983:
Perceived initial setup costs of information and other factors that can deter investment make it unlikely that most nonstockholder households enter the market between 1983 and 1989, and most of the nonstockholder households in 1983 did remain nonstockholders in 1989. For these households, the average estimated unconditional probability of ownership in either year is quite low, and the probability of becoming a stockholder by 1989, conditional on being a nonstockholder in 1983, is even lower. More than 96% of the 1983 nonstockholder households that remain nonstockholders in 1989 are correctly identified by having a conditional probability of remaining nonstockholders greater than the conditional probability of becoming stockholders. Nonstockholder households with higher education, lower risk aversion, and greater financial and nonfinancial resources were more likely to have overcome inertial behavior generated by information costs, and have a larger estimated probability of ownership in 1989 conditional on nonownership in 1983. Nevertheless, only about one-fourth of the households that became stockholders are correctly identified on the basis of their estimated conditional probabilities. For the remaining households, random factors and variables not covered by the model, perhaps reflecting changes in the threshold of information expense sufficient to deter investment or improved access to investment opportunities, may account for their entrance into the stock market.
Stockholders in 1983:
If households made the initial information expense and participated in the market in 1983, the probability of remaining stockholders is high, even though information or monitoring costs recur each year. For these households, the average conditional probability of remaining stockholders is about 0.77, and the model cor- rectly identifies nearly 92% of the households that remain stockholders on the basis of their estimated conditional probabilities. The model is also able to explain about 38% of households that dropped out of the stock market between 1983 and 1989. These households had on average a slight deterioration in financial and nonfinancial wealth between 1983 and 1989. In addition, about half of these households had stated willingness to take average or above average financial risk in 1983, but responded that they were ''not willing to take any financial risk'' in 1989, perhaps in reaction to their portfolio performance during the stock market drop in 1987. However, 73 of the sample households that left the stock market after participating in 1983 have characteristics that would predict their continuing participation. About half of these households did hold stocks in defined contribution pension plans or in managed trust accounts in 1989, and may have shifted their direct stock ownership to managed accounts between 1983 and 1989. In addition, some of these households may have been only temporarily out of the stock market in 1989.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Results from panel data for 1983 and 1989 show that most U.S. households demonstrate considerable persistence in their portfolio investments. Households that chose to hold riskless assets but not stocks may do so because they perceive the information required for participation to be costly relative to the benefits received. Factors such as increased risk aversion, income risk, and lower resources can reduce the utility gains from market participation, and reduce the level of information cost that would be sufficient to deter households from stock investment. Formal econometric analysis shows that households with lower wealth and higher risk aversion are less likely to hold stocks in both 1983 and 1989. The hypothesis that information costs are an important reason for the low incidence of stockholding is supported by the finding that factors such as age, education, and inheritance of assets are significant in explaining the probability of holding stocks and have similar effects on the probability of ownership in both years. The combined effects of the differences in the 1983 and 1989 intercept terms and income and wealth coefficients are consistent with the observed slight broadening in the base of stock ownership.
The results for conditional probabilities are also consistent with the idea that the ability to overcome inertial behavior is an important explanation for portfolio allocation. Most households are nonstockholders and are likely to remain nonstockholders. Households with greater willingness to undertake financial risk, higher education, and greater wealth who nonetheless had not overcome inertial behavior to enter the stock market by 1983 have a much increased likelihood of entering by 1989. However, households who owned stocks in 1983 but have lower resources, more limited education, and less willingness to take financial risk are more likely to have dropped out the market by 1989, perhaps because the ongoing costs of monitoring the investments are perceived to be too high relative to the expected benefits of continued participation. With the exception of becoming married between 1983 and 1989, few lifestyle changes appear to explain changes in stockholder status.
Financial advisors suggest that all households should invest in the stock market, although the proportion of the portfolio invested in stocks may vary according to investment horizon and tolerance for financial risk. However, despite an upward trend in stock market participation, most households in 1995 still did not own stocks. If there is an increasing trend to require individuals to plan for their own financial futures, perhaps because of expected inadequacies of Social Security and private pensions, the results presented here suggest that education and advertising campaigns can be instrumental in helping households overcome reluctance to hold stocks caused by insufficient information about the benefits, risks, and costs of market participation.
